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Intentional forgetting benefits 
from thought substitution 
PAULA T. HERTEL and GINA CALCATERRA 
Trinity University, San Antonio, Texas 
This study provides both experimental and correlational evidence that forgetting in the think/no-think 
paradigm (Anderson & Green, 2001) is sensitive to the substitution of thoughts about new events for 
thoughts that are to be suppressed. All the participants learned a list of adjective-noun pairs. Then the 
adjectives were presented as cues for recalling half of the nouns and as cues for suppressing the other 
half, 0, 2, or 12 times. Aided participants were provided with substitute nouns, to use during suppres­
sion. On a final test that requested recall of all initially learned nouns, aided participants showed evidence 
of below-baseline forgetting of suppressed nouns. Unaided participants produced below-baseline for­
getting only if their later self-reports indicated that they had complied relatively well with instnictions 
for suppression. Independently, forgetting in the unaided condition was more successful when the par­
ticipants reportedly thought about something else during suppression trials. In general, the use of self­
initiated strategies seems to affect the degree of forgetting in the think/no-think paradigm. 
Some past events are best not remembered, particularly 
by people with ruminative tendencies. Intentional forget­
ting is, therefore, a skill that is worth developing, and a rea­
sonable method is to practice not thinking the unwanted 
thought whenever a previously effective cue is encountered. 
However, this method does not guarantee later forget­
ting, as has been illustrated by outcomes from the think/ 
no-think paradigm used by Anderson and Green (200 I). 
After the participants in the experiments by Anderson 
and Green (200 1) had studied pairs of unrelated nouns, 
they spent a variable number of trials either rehearsing or 
suppressing second-item nouns (responses) when cued 
with the first. On each suppression trial, they were in­
structed not to think about the response term when the 
cue appeared on the screen. The final test, requesting re­
call of all responses, rehearsed and suppressed, revealed 
below-baseline recall of suppressed responses. Suppressed 
responses were recalled less well than responses for which 
cues were never presented between initial learning and the 
final test. Still, average recall in the most successful sup­
pression conditions hovered around 70%. Although this 
level of forgetting is impressive, considering the param­
eters of suppression practice in the paradigm, clearly 
there is room for improvement. 
The responses to be suppressed in the think/no-think 
paradigm are akin to unwanted thoughts. Unwanted 
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thoughts might be subjected to ironic control processes 
(Wegner, 1994), whereby checking for success in inhibiting 
the thought ushers it in once again. To avoid this revolv­
ing door, people sometimes stumble upon the technique 
of thinking about something else when cues for the un­
wanted thought come to mind. The technique is likely to 
aid forgetting, because it is analogous to the experimen­
tal paradigm of retrieval-induced forgetting (Anderson & 
Spellman, 1995), in which rehearsal of items related to 
category cues prevents later recall of other previously 
studied items in the same categories. More generally, the 
strategy of thinking about something else is one of de­
liberately introducing retroactive interference effects in 
the remembering of unwanted thoughts. (See Anderson 
& Neely, 1996, for a review of retrieval-induced forget­
ting situated in the context of the interference literature.) 
The relation between success in the think/no-think 
paradigm and the use of thought substitutes is the issue 
that motivated the present experiment. Our cues for re­
sponding or suppressing were adjectives with meaning­
ful relations to both the original response term and the 
substitute response (see also Hertel & Gerstle, 2003). 
Apart from characterizing the nature of cuing in real­
world settings, meaningful relations. between the cues 
and the responses seemed particularly important in speed­
ing the learning of the cue substitute pairs during the sup­
pression phase. We examined the effect of learning to use 
these substitutes on subsequent recall of the originally 
learned responses. To reduce response competition, in­
structions on the final test permitted recall of both orig­
inal responses and substitutes (akin to the MMFR test 
developed by Barnes & Underwood, 1959). We also ex­
amined the correlation between the uninstructed use of a 
substitution strategy and success in suppression under 
typical no-think conditions. 
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METHOD 
Materials 
As in the experiment by Hertel and Gerstle (2003), related 
adjective-noun pairs were selected from those used by Hertel and 
Parks (2002). All 36 nouns were four to seven letters long (M = 5.3), 
with concreteness and imageability ratings greater than 5 (M = 6.4, 
on 7-point scales from Paivio, Yuille, & Madigan, 1968), emotion­
ality ratings less than 4 (M = 3.1 ), and goodness ratings between 3 
and 5 (M = 4.5, on 7'-point scales from Rubin & Friendly, 1986). 
All those characteristics� plus frequency of occurrence (M = 67 .5; 
Kucera & Francis, 1967), were used to distribute the nouns in a bal­
anced fashion into six sets of six nouns each. Each noun was ac­
companied by an emotionally neutral adjective (e.g., porcelain doll, 
security of icer, racing hound), and the six sets were balanced on 
ratings of emotionality for the pairs (M = 4.3 on a 9-point scale rang­
ing from extremely positive to extremely negative; Hertel & Parks, 
2002). All the pairs were used in the learning phase. Subsequently, 
three sets were assigned to suppression (baseline or 0 cue presen­
tations, 2 presentations, and 12 presentations), and three sets were 
assigned to responding (0, 2, and 12). Filler items consisted of I 0 
additional neutral adjective-noun pairs from the same pool. · 
Substitute� to be used in the aided condition of suppression con:.. 
sisted of new nouns associated with the original adjectives (in our 
judgment). Examples include porcelain goblet, security vehicle; and 
racing costume. The substituted nouns averaged 5:7 letters long, 6.7 
in concreteness, 2.5 in emotionality, 4.1 in ·goodness, and 69.3 in 
frequency. The six sets of six original pairs were also balanced on 
these measures for the substitutes. 
Participants and Design 
Under the constraint of equal cell sizes, 72 students ( 48 women and 
24 men) were randomly assigned to the una:ided or aided condition 
of suppression. I Within each condition, equal numbers within each 
gender were then assigned to the six counterbalancing conditions 
for rotating material sets across the factorial· combination of in­
structions (respond vs. suppress) and number of cue presentations 
(0, 2, and 12). 
Procedure 
All tasks were implemented on Superlab Pro software. Most de­
tails of the procedure replicated those used by Hertel and Gerstle 
(2003 ), which were based on Anderson and Green (200 1 ). 
Learning phase. We presented each word pair in black font, 
centered on the screen, for 5 sec, during which time the participant 
created a self-referential mental image involving the concept denoted 
by the pair. (Beforehand, we gave them the example pair sandy 
beach and suggested that they might imagine themselves walking 
along a sandy beach.) Next, the rated meaningfu!ness of the image 
was reported aloud and keyed by the experimenter. The order of 
presentation, constant across participants, consisted of six random­
ized blocks of seven pairs (one pair from each of the six sets, plus 
one filler pair). Two additional filler pairs were placed at the be-
ginning of the list, and two at the end. · 
Learning was assessed by requesting recall of the response word to 
each cue. The cues were displayed in black font; centered, for 5,200 msec 
(or less, if the participant responded sooner). Feedback consisted of 
a 2-sec exposure of the response word in blue font. If fewer than 
50% of the responses on the first assessment were correct, another 
test was administered (for a maximum of three cycles with differ­
ent orders within blocks of seven cues). All the participants achieved 
the criterion by three tests. 
Suppression-training phase. We instructed all the participants 
that they would again see cue words, but this time the words would 
be presented in eith�r green or red font. They were asked to respond 
to green cues with the responses, as they had done during the pre­
vious assessment. To red cues, they were asked to continue to attend 
but to avoid saying or even thinking about the associated response 
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word. Nine filler cues appeared in green, once or twice each, and one 
cue appeared in red eight times (for suppression practice). In the 
aided condition, we gave the participants a substitute to recall when 
the red cue appeared and told them it would help them not to think 
about the response word. Other procedural details duplicated those 
used in the main suppression phase. At the end of the training phase, 
a short questionnaire assessed whether the participant understood 
the procedure, and corrections were provided if necessary. 
Immediately before the main suppression phase, the aided partic­
ipants viewed the 12 randomly ordered cue substitute pairs for 3 sec 
each. They were instructed to learn them in whatever way they pre­
ferred but never to think about the original response to each cue. 
Suppression phase. In the main suppression phase, green cues 
for responding 2 or 12 times and red cues for suppressing 2 or 12 times 
were presented for a total of 168 trials. Six filler cues for respond­
ing (used during practice) were also each presented 12 times, in green, 
for an additional 72 trials. The trials were randomly ordered and 
separated by a 400-msec intertrial interval (ITI). Each trial was an­
nounced by a set of small crosses for 200 msec. The cue was then 
presented for 3 sec (or less, if the participant responded sooner). In­
correct or absent responses on response trials were followed by a 
500-msec display ofthe response word in blue font. Responses to a 
cue for suppression initiated the display of very large redXs, followed 
by a 500-msec display of the substitute in the aided condition. 
Final test phase. The constant test order consisted of four filler 
cues, then six randomized blocks of one cue from each of the six 
sets. On each trial, following a 200-msec display of crosses, the cue 
was displayed for 4 sec (or less, if the participant responded 
sooner'). The ITI was 400 msec, and no feedback was given. The par­
ticipants were asked to recall the initial response word for each cue, 
regardless of prior instructions. In both conditions, they were told 
that if more than one word should come to mind, they might say 
that other word as well and not be concerned about which one was 
correct. In the aided condition, we added the explanation that, be­
cause they had also learned substitutes for some of the cues, they 
might say both initial responses and substitutes aloud. Everyone 
was reminded that it. was very important to recall the correct re­
sponse word from the first part of the experiment. 
Strategy questionnaire. After the final test, we asked the par­
ticipants to fill out a questionnaire concerning strategies for sup­
pression. Table 1 lists the items. The first three were obtained from 
Michael Anderson (personal communication, May 18, 2002), and 
we added the last two. Each item was followed by a scale-
0 (never), 1 (rarely), 2 (sometimes), 3 (frequently), and 4 (very 
frequently}-and the participants were instructed to circle a num­
ber that represented their use of th.e strategy. 
RESULTS 
Overall Analysis 
The mean percentages of response words recalled on 
the final test are depicted in Figure 1. The percentages 
were submitted to a mixed design analysis of variance 
(ANOVA), with a between-subjects factor for the condi­
tion for suppression (unaided vs. aided) and within­
subjects factors for instruction during the suppression 
phase (suppress vs. respond) and the number of times 
that the cues were presented (0, 2, or 12).2 The signifi­
cance level was set at .05. Significant main effects qual­
ified by significant interactions are. not reported. 
The effect of instruction (suppress vs. respond) de­
pended on the number of times the cues were presented 
[F(2,96) = 27.25, MSe = 2 17.34,p < .001] . As was antic­
ipated, this interaction was qualified by the higher order 
interaction of instruction and cue presentation with sup-
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Table 1 
Items on the Strategy Questionnaire 
1 read the hint word [and then]: 
Made sure I still knew the associated word first, and then tried to not 
think of this associated word. 
Tried to not think of the associated response, but then after the trial 
was over I made sure I still remembered the response word. 
Kept myself from saying the response word aloud, but kept repeating 
the response word to myself to improve my memory for it. 
Kept myself from thinking about the original response word by 
thinking about something else (another word or image, for example). 
Kept myself from thinking about the response word by keeping my 
mind completely blank. 
pression condition [unaided vs. aided; F(2,96) = 5.40,p < 
. 0 1]. Figure 1 shows that forgetting was aided by the provi­
sion of substitutes in both the 2- and the 12-presentation 
conditions. In the unaided condition, the mean percentages 
of suppressed responses recalled were 82, 83, and 82 (for 
0, 2, and 12 cue presentations, respectively). The corre­
sponding means in the aided condition were 83, 70, and 
68. Clearly, below-baseline suppression obtained only in 
the aided condition [F(l ,30) = 27 .95, MSe = 248.46, 
p < .001]. 
Compliance in the Unaided Condition 
Next, to evaluate the lack-of below-baseline suppres­
sion in the unaided condition; we included a factor for how 
well the participants reportedly complied with suppres­
sion instructions. Their responses to the first three items 
on the strategy questionnaire were summed to constitute 
a score for noncompliance. A median split on these scores 
within each counterbalancing condition produced the 
noncompliance factor,3 which was included in an A NOVA, 
along with within-subjects factors for instruction (respond 
vs. suppress) and number of cue presentations. The three­
way interaction was significant [F(2,48) = 5 .36, MSe = 
156.25,p < .01]. 
Figure 2 shows that only the participants who reported 
lower use of strategies in conflict with suppression in­
structions produced below-baseline suppression, accord­
ing to a comparison of baseline with 2 and 12 cue pre­
sentations [F( l ,  12} = 4.85, MSe = 420.52,p < .05]. The 
means were 88% (baseline), 7 4% (2 presentations), and 
80% ( 12 presentations). However, the comparison be­
tween baseline and recall of responses suppressed 12 times 
was nonsignificant, perhaps due to low power. In contrast, 
the noncompliant participants tended to recall responses 
that they had been instructed to suppress more frequently 
than baseline responses [F( l,  12) = 3.69, MSe = 706.02, 
p < .08]. The means were 75% (baseline), 92% (2 pre­
sentations), and 82% ( 12 presentations). Again, the com­
parison between baseline and recall of responses "sup­
pressed" 12 times was nonsignificant. 
Thought Substitution in the Unaided Condition 
We examined the correlation between ratings on Item 4 
on the strategy questionnaire (kept myself from thinking 
about the original response word by thinking about 
something else) and the size of the instruction effect (the 
number recalled from all cues for responding minus the 
number recalled from all cues for suppression, omitting 
baseline data). The participants who produced larger in..; 
struction effects reported more frequently having thought 
about something else [r(34) = .45, p < .01]. Although 
the instruction effect was also significantly correlated 
with the noncompliance score [r(34) = -.33,p < .05], 
the noncompliance score was not significantly.correlated. 
with reported use of the substitution strategy [r (34) = 
- .16, p > .30]. ( The mean rating for use of the substitu­
tion strategy was 3.3 for more compliant participants and 
2.7 for less compliant participants.) And.wheri the non­
compliance score was entered first in an equation to pre� 
diet the size of the instruction effect, the increase in R2 
by adding the substitution rating was .16 [F( I ,33) � 7.13, 
p < .02]. Therefore, the ability of a substitution strategy 
to account for success in suppression: was not an artifact 
of whether the participant complied with instructions. 
As an illustration of the advantage of substitution, me­
dian splits within each counterbalancing conditi()n iden­
tified low and high users of this strategy.4 The average 
rating was 2.2 (sometimes) in the low-use group and 3.9 
in the high-use group (very frequently). Although per­
forming an ANOVA with the dichotomized substitution 
strategy as a factor lacks the power of the regression 
analysis, it was performed to address the issue of below­
baseline suppression. As is shown in Figure 3, substitu­
tion interacted significantly with instruction (respond vs. 
suppress) and number of cue presentations [F(2,48) = 















Number of Cue Presentations 
Figure 1. Mean percentages of original response words recalled 
as a function of number of cue presentations f01:- suppressing or re­
sponding in each condition for practicing suppression (unaided vs. 
aided). An error bar represents one standard error of the mean. 
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Figure 2. Mean percentages of response words recalled ac­
cording to the number of cue presentations for suppressing or re­
sponding in the unaided condition (solid lines). Noncompliance 
with suppression instructions Oow vs. high) was determined by a 
median split on the summed ratings for Items 1-3 on the strategy 
questionnaire. The means in the aided condition (dashed lines) 'are provided for comparison. An error bar represents one stan­
dard error of the mean. 
5.76, MSe = 158.18,p < .01]. High substitute users 
recalled fewer responses suppressed 12 times than re­
sponses in the baseline condition [F( l ,12) = 4. 97, 
MSe = 524.69,p < .05]. Means were 85%, 77%, and 73 % 
following 0, 2, and 12 cue presentations, respectively. 
Recall of Substitutes in the Aided Condition 
On the final test, the aided participants recalled an av­
erage of 34% of the substitutes used twice and 56% of those 
used 12 times[F(1,24) = 16.50,MSe = 374.23,p < .001]. 
Recall instructions emphasized the importance of recall­
ing the original response words but merely permitted the 
recall of substitutes, so these levels are likely to underes­
timate participants' ability to recall substitutes if the im­
portance of doing so is stressed. 
Recall of substitutes did not clearly predict the forget­
ting of original responses on a trial-by-trial basis. When 
substitutes were recalled,, they were accompanied by 
original responses oil. 56% of the trials (SD = 40. 7.3). 
Out of the trials during which the participants failed to 
recall the original response, only 54% of the substitutes 
were recalled (SD = 36.37): 
DISCUSSION 
According to these results, our advice to those who want 
to forget is to think about something else that can be 
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meaningfully related to the cue most likely to invoke the 
unwanted memory. This is the advice derived from exper­
iments on retrieval-induced forgetting, as well as from ex­
periments on retroactive interference in general, and it now 
applies to situations in which unwanted thoughts are de­
liberately suppressed. 
The provision of substitutes in this experiment caused 
more forgetting of suppressed responses than did the in­
struction merely. to suppress thoughts of the to� be­
forgotten responses .. Importantly, substitutes were pro­
vided in addition to the typical suppression instructions 
used by Anderson and Green (200 1 ), and the instructions 
emphasized the importance of never thinking about the 
original responses during the learning of the substitutes. 
Otherwise, retrieval-induced forgetting would likely be 
impaired by relations between the responses to each cue 
(see Anderson & McCulloch, 1999). The primary em­
phasis on the suppression of initial responses also makes 
the results in the aided condition not merely a replica­
tion of classic retroactive interference experiments but, 
instead, shows· how retroactive. interference can con­
tribute to intentional forgetting. . 
One possible explanation for the effect of substitutes 
is that there was simply more to be remembered-36 ini­
tial responses and 12 substitutes. Against this explana­
tion, we found similar ceiling levels for the recall of re­
sponded items in both groups, as well as a significant 
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Figure 3. Mean percentages of response words recalled according 
to the number of cue presentations for suppressing or responding 
in the unaided condition (solid lines). Low versus high use of the 
thought substitution strategy was determined by a median split on 
the ratings for Item 4 on the strategy questionnaire. The means in 
the aided condition (dashed lines) are provided for comparison. An 
error bar represents one standard error of the mean. 
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initiated strategy of thinking about something else. An­
other possible explanation can be derived from a response 
competition or blocking fr�mework. Although we used 
self-paced recall, invited the report of both response 
words in the aided condition, and stressed the impor­
tance of recalling the original, response competition can­
not be ruled out. It is also possible that some ·participants 
were satisfied with the recall of just one response, the 
more recent one, or that the initial response sometimes 
underwent output interference from the person's having 
produced the substitute first on the final test trial. Nei­
ther situation can be ruled out by the data. Perhaps the use 
of independent cues for recalling the original responses 
would help to identify which processes are mainly re­
sponsible for the effect in the aided condition (see An­
derson, 2003 ). Anderson and Green's (200 I) use of inde­
pendent cues was essential to their argument that inhibition 
is responsible for forgetting in the think/no-think para­
digm. And inhibition from the retrieval of substitutes 
might similarly be revealed. 
Next, we note that the data in the unaided condition 
conceptually replicated the findings of below-baseline 
suppression obtained by Anderson and Green (200 I ; see 
also Anderson et al., 2004), if participants reported com-:­
pliance with instructions for suppression. As compared 
with baseline, they forgot responses subjected to sup� 
pression attempts, although not significantly so. follow­
ing _12 attempts and clearly not as well as did the aided 
participants given 12 attempts. Even more interesting 
was the conceptual replication by the participants who 
reportedly used a thought substitution strategy and sub­
sequently showed levels of forgetting siinilarto those ob­
tained in the aided condition. Importantly, both findings 
of below-baseline suppression were obtained following 
many fewer suppression trials than those constituting 
Anderson and Green's suppression phase (2 and 12, as 
compared with I, 8, and 16). And unlike in Anderson 
and Green's studies, they were obtained from related 
cue-response pairs (as was the marginally significant ev­
idence of below-baseline suppression obtained by Hertel 
& Gerstle, 2003). However, some recent attempts to 
replicate the effect have not been successful (e.g., Bule­
vich, Roediger, & Balota, 2003), and the present results 
suggest that the size of the suppression effect might in­
deed depend on the use of self-initiated strategies. If a 
substantial number of participants choose strategies of 
noncompliance, the effect will certainly be weakened or 
.eliminated. On the other hand, if a substantial number of 
participants choose to think about something else while 
suppressing, perhaps not even explicit substitutes, the ef­
fect should clearly be obtained. 
As a final note, the thought substitution strategy might 
be effective either due to practice in retrieving the sub­
stitutes (classic inhibition or interference explanations) 
or simply because the focus on some other matter keeps 
the temptation of ironic control at bay. The latter hypoth-
esis would be supported indirectly by a significant inverse 
correlation between reports of noncompliance and reports 
of substitution use�a correlation that was nonsignifi­
cant in this experiment. Nevertheless, there should be 
more direct ways to discover whether thought substitu­
tion succeeds, at least in part, because an idle mind is the 
memory devil 's workshop. 
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NOTES 
I. Because we thought that substitutes might help depressed partici­
pants more than nondepressed, the participants were selected according 
to their scores (below 6 and above 8) on the Beck Depression Inventory 
(BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) in a previous 
class administration. In each cell of the design, 2 women and l man scored 
in the high group, and the same distribution obtained for scores in the 
low group. The factor for BDI group did not interact wi�h other factors 
in any of the analyses we performed (all Fs < l ), so these aspects of the 
procedure are omitted for brevity's sake. Failures to find evidence of 
depression-related deficits in forgetting (Hertel & Gerstle, 2003) might 
be due to the nonemotional nature of these materials (as compared with 
Hertel & Gerstle's emotional pairs), the use of far fewer suppression tri-
als (2 or 12, as compared with l, 8, or 16), or relatively low BDI scores 
in the dysphoric group (M = 15). 
· 
2. A between-subjects factor for the six counterbalancing conditions 
was included in order to reduce error variance in this and subsequent 
analyses; those effects are not reported. 
. 
3. Three 2-way ties in the split procedure were resolved randomly. 
The compliance factor was independent of BDI group ( cp = 0). The 
mean noncompliance scores were l. 7 and 4.9 for low versus high non­
compliance, respectively. 
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4. Three 3-way ties in the median split procedures were resolved ran­
domly. The category for substitution was independent of BDI group 
( cp = .222, p > . 15) and the noncompliance categorization ( cp = -.l l ,  
p > .50) . 
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